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History

An "invisible enemy" strikes U.S. soldiers in a faraway
land we claim to be saving; overwhelming American
firepower kills thousands before many citizens realize their
president used phony pretexts to justify military action;
policy makers insist that while progress is steady we must
be patient; anti-American guerrillas attack their own
countrymen, whom they deem U.S. "puppets"; only a few
nations send troops to support the United States' cause;
talk of a "quagmire" fills the air.
Sound familiar? The specter of the Vietnam War so haunts
the American soul there is no keeping it repressed, try as
we might. Even events bearing only superficial similarity
to that two-decade disaster can trigger its memory. So for
many the ongoing guerrilla war in Iraq has become a
Vietnam War Rorschach test, in which troubling images of
the present evoke nightmares of the past.
No wonder Donald Rumsfeld clinches his jaw whenever
he hears the Q-word. In many ways, of course, the IraqVietnam analogy is strained, even absurd. We're
comparing four months to two decades; linking a
beleaguered occupation of Iraq after the speedy
overthrow of a despised dictator to a protracted war on
behalf of an unpopular South Vietnamese government
against a nationwide Communist movement led by the
widely revered Ho Chi Minh (who was supported by China
and the Soviet Union); 240 American deaths in Iraq to
58,000 in Vietnam; perhaps 15,000 Iraqi deaths to three
million Vietnamese.
However, there are also real similarities between the two
wars that should be of great concern, the most important
of which is that in Iraq, as in South Vietnam, massive
numbers of American troops are being asked not just to
fight a war, but to achieve an extremely difficult, perhaps
impossible, political goal. In both wars the United States
publicly defined its ultimate objective as the establishment
of political self-rule and independence on foreign ground,
of a local government that could survive without a large
and permanent American occupation force.

On April 7, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson said, "We
want nothing for ourselves -- only that the people of South
Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own
way." President Bush makes precisely the same claim
about Iraq. In truth, the selflessness is as fraudulent now
as it was then. Just as four American presidents refused
to consider a South Vietnamese government that would
include Communist participation, the Bush administration
is not about to tolerate a radical Islamist government
unfriendly to a significant U.S. political, economic and
military presence. In Iraq, perhaps even more than in
Vietnam, the United States wants to determine the
outcome of "self-determination."
But just as in Vietnam, American troops in Iraq are likely
to prove incapable of building local support for any
government -- pro-American, truly self-determining or
otherwise. In fact, if we can predict one thing from history,
it's that their armed presence is almost guaranteed to
generate opposition to any government associated with
U.S. interests. In Vietnam, the more troops we inserted
and the more Vietnamese we killed, the more anger and
resentment our policies produced, thus giving ever more
legitimacy to the forces opposing U.S. intervention.
We can't expect soldiers to win "hearts and minds," least
of all when they're being fired on. What we can expect is
that our increasingly frustrated, homesick and
demoralized troops may become ever more cynical about
"nation-building" and fall back on the line infamously
uttered by an American officer in Vietnam, "Grab 'em by
the balls and their hearts and minds will follow."
We should have learned from Vietnam that military
dominance is not the same thing as political legitimacy. Of
course, we have the power to occupy Iraq indefinitely. But,
as in Vietnam, it may be that no foreign power can install
a government that will gain the widespread support of its
own people. And the American people may eventually
decide it is no longer worth trying.
Christian G. Appy holds a Ph.D. in American civilization and
has taught at both Harvard University and MIT, where he was

an associate professor of history. He is the author of Patriots:
The Vietnam War Remembered From All Sides. This article
first appeared in TomPaine.com (www.tompaine.com)

